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INTRODUCTION

Prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the law in
Texas concerning authentication and identification consisted of a
combination of common law doctrines and statutes. Many of the
statutes that were repealed in conjunction with the promulgation of
the Rules dealt with authentication of writings.' That entire subject,
along with the related matter of identification of evidence other than
writings, is now covered in Article IX of the Rules. Although in
substance Article IX does not bring about any radical changes in
Texas law, it does replace statutes and doctrines with which Texas
trial lawyers and judges were familiar, using a format and language
new to Texas. The purpose of this article is to describe the basic
1. When it adopted the Rules of Evidence, the Texas Supreme Court ordered the repeal, as to civil actions, of a number of statutes, pursuant to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1731a (Vernon 1962) (supreme court may promulgate rules of procedure for civil actions
and may order repeal of inconsistent statutes). More than half of the repealed provisions
dealt with authentication matters now covered by Article IX of the Rules. See TEX. REV.

CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3718-3732, 3734a, 3737a-3737c, 3737e (Vernon 1926 & Supp. 1984),
repealed as to civil matiers by Court Rules, Tex. Sup. Ct., Tex. Cases 641-642 S.W.2d xxxv
(1982) (order effective Sept. I, 1983). This order may be found in the Texas Rules of
Evidence.
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structure and features of the new Rules and their relationship to
prior Texas law.2
II.

COMPARISON OF THE TEXAS RULES AND
THE FEDERAL RULES

Article IX of the Texas Rules of Evidence is nearly identical to its
model, Article IX of the Federal Rules of Evidence. There are three
rules, the first two of which contain a number of component provisions. Of the seven provisions in the Texas Rules that contain any
differences at all from the federal counterparts, only two could be
said to differ in substance: a minor substantive variation appears in
Rule 901(a)(3), and Texas Rule 902(10) adds a device not found at
all in the Federal Rules. The insertion of Texas Rule 902(10) required that Federal Rule 902(10) be renumbered to become Texas
Rule 902(11). The other differences are insignificant. Texas Rule
902(3) contains a sentence that does not appear in the Federal
Rules, but the addition amounts to a clarification rather than a
change. Finally, in Texas Rules 901(b)(10), 902(4), and 902(11) the
language used to refer to other laws was changed in order to suit the
state setting.
III.

A.

PROVISION-BY-PROVISION ANALYSIS

OF ARTICLE

IX

Rule 901(a)." GeneralProvision

"Authentication and identification," according to the drafters of
the Federal Rules, "represent a special aspect of relevancy." 4 They
explain: "Thus a telephone conversation may be irrelevant because
on an unrelated topic or because the speaker is not identified. The
latter aspect is the one here involved."5 As the example shows, the
problem of authentication or identification is not confined to documentary and real evidence. It arises whenever the relevancy of any
evidence depends upon its identity, source, or connection with a
particular person, place, thing, or event. As Wigmore put it, "the
foundation on which the necessity of authentication rests, is not any
2.
3.
4.
5.

The text of Article IX is reproduced as the appendix to this article.
See infra text accompanying notes 111-12.
FED. R. EvID. 901(a) advisory committee note.
Id. Authentication of telephone conversations is governed by Rules 901(b) (5) and

(b)(6). See infra text accompanying notes 49-60.
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artificial principle of evidence, but an inherent logical necessity" 6
This idea is borne out by the fact that neither the common law nor
the Federal and Texas Rules of Evidence contains any comprehensive attempt to prescribe the circumstances in which authentication
is required. Whether authentication is called for must in every instance be determined by "logical necessity," that is, by whether the
relevancy of the proffered evidence depends upon its identity,
source, or connection with a particular person, place, thing, or event.
Rule 901(a), then, while styled the "General provision" on authentication, does not indicate when and in what respect evidence
must be authenticated. That can only be determined, as just indicated, by asking whether the identity, source, etc. of the evidence, in
the context in which it is offered, are material; if so, then to that
extent authentication or identification are by "logical necessity" required. All that Rule 901(a) tells us is that when authentication or
identification is required, the requirement "is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims." 7 The Federal Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 901(a) explains: "The requirement of showing authenticity or
identity falls in the category of relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set
forth in Rule 104(b)." 8 Federal Rule 104(b) provides: "Relevancy
conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition."9 One of the illustrations
given by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 104(b)
is: "[I]f a letter purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish
an admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y wrote or
authorized it. Relevance in this sense has been labeled 'conditional
relevancy.' "10
Both at common law" and under the Rules, preliminary ques6. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
rev. ed. 1978) (emphasis in original).
7. TEX. R. EvID. 901(a).
8. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) advisory committee note.

LAW

§ 2129, at 703 (Chadbourn

9. Id. 104(b).

10. Id. 104(b) advisory committee note.
11. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/5

§ 2550, at 640-41

4

Wellborn: Authentication and Identification under Article IX of the Texas R

19851

TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE

tions of fact thus determinative of "conditional relevancy"-including, as in this example, questions of authenticity or identity-are
generally given to juries. The only role of the judge with respect to
these preliminary questions is to determine whether a "prima facie
case"--evidence sufficient to support a jury finding-has been
presented. This is quite unlike the treatment accorded other preliminary fact questions that determine the admissibility of evidence,
such as fact questions concerning the existence of a privilege or the
applicability of a hearsay exception. Fact questions determinative
of the competency, as distinguished from the relevancy, of evidence
are decided outright by the judge, both at common law' 2 and under
Federal and Texas Rules 104(a). Why are questions of conditional
relevancy, including authenticity, treated differently? The Federal
Advisory Committee explains:
If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined
solely by the judge, . . . the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact
would be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed.
These are appropriate questions for juries. Accepted treatment, as
provided in the rule, is consistent with that given fact questions generally. The judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the
condition. If so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the
issue is in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not established, the issue is for them. If the
evidence is not such as to allow a finding, the judge withdraws the
matter from their consideration.' 3
The "prima facie case" standard of authentication or identification
4
under Rule 901(a) is supported by prior Texas law and practice.'
B.

Rule 901(b): Illustrations
Rule 901(b) appears to be designed to permit as much flexibility
as possible in matters of authentication. It lists nine examples of
authentication techniques, plus a tenth provision incorporating by
reference any additional methods that might be recognized by statute or court rule. The examples, even with the addition of those
12. See id at 641.
13. FED. R. EvID. 104(b) advisory committee note.
14. See Barrera v. Duval County Ranch Co., 135 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1939, writ ref'd); Tartt & Wolff, Article IX: Authentication andIdentification,20
Hous. L. REV. 551, 553 (1983).
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incorporated by reference, are explicitly stated not to be exclusive.
As one commentator has noted, however:
While the ten subdivisions of Rule 901(b) are illustrative and not
limiting, they are in aggregate so comprehensive-especially with the
general language in subdivision (b)(1) on testimony that a matter "is
what it is claimed to be" and subdivision (b)(4) on "distinctive characteristics" and "circumstances"-that it is hard to envision a reasonable form of authenticating proof that would not be embraced by
these illustrations. "
C.

Rule 901(b)(1)." Testimony of Witness With Knowledge

An obvious method of satisfying the requirement of prima facie
identification of an item and/or its source, etc., is to present the testimony of a person with personal knowledge that the item is what it
is claimed to be. In the case of an object or document that has
unique or distinctive characteristics, testimony of a single person
who perceived the item at the relevant time normally suffices to
identify it in court. Where the object is not distinctive in appearance, a so-called "chain of custody" may be required in order to
establish that the item presented at trial is indeed the same one that
had a role in the events in issue. A "chain of custody" consists of
testimony of each person who had custody of the item from the time
connection with the case to the time of its
of its discovery or initial
16
presentation at trial.
When real evidence is offered, often its condition, as well as its
identity, is important. When this is so, a proper foundation must
include evidence that the item is in substantially the same condition
when presented as at the legally material time, e.g., the time of the
accident, the time of first discovery, etc.' 7 Like identity, continuity
of condition can sometimes be shown by a single witness. If any
plausible material change in the object would be palpable, it suffices
that the witness who identifies the object also testifies that it appears
15. 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 506,

at 24 (1981).

16. See, e.g., United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1980); In re Swine Flu
Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D.C. Colo. 1980); Luna v. State,
493 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see also Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the
Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 527, 556 (1983).
17. See Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960); Giannelli, Chain of
Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1983).
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8
to be in the same condition as when previously perceived by him.'
If, on the other hand, the object is of a nature that admits a risk of
material but impalpable change-such as a chemical or bodily fluid
specimen-then mere assertion by the identifying witness of the absence of any apparent change in its condition may not suffice. In
such a case, continuity of condition must be established by a "chain
of custody."1 9 It is not required, however, that all possibility of tampering or adulteration be eliminated.2 ° Moreover, even if a change
in the condition of an item has occurred, it is not necessarily thereby
rendered inadmissible. So long as the probative value of the item,
despite the change, outweighs the danger of misleading the jury, it
will still be admissible, and the change in its condition will be a
matter going only to its weight as evidence. 2 '

D. Rule 901(b)(2). Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting
Rule 901(b)(2) perpetuates the rather liberal receptivity of the
common law toward lay identification of handwriting. Any person
claiming some familiarity with the handwriting of the putative author is permitted to testify to his opinion as to the genuineness of the
disputed document, and an affirmative opinion ordinarily suffices to
make out a prima facie case of authenticity. 22 Normally, the requisite familiarity will have been acquired by the witness having actually seen the person write,23 or by having exchanged correspondence
18. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 212, at 667-68 (3d

ed. 1984).
19. See Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (quoting C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 212, at 527 (2d ed. 1972)); Easley v.

State, 472 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
20. See United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1073 (7th Cir.),
843 (1977); Salinas v. State, 407 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. Crim. App.
State, 505 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Wright v. State,
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
21. See Young v. State, 629 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. App.-Fort
dismissed, -

U.S.

-,

104 S. Ct. 1262,

-

L. Ed. 2d

-

cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1974); Winegarner v.
420 S.W.2d 411, 413
Worth 1982), appeal

(1984); M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF

156 (1981); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
1984).
22. See Bodiford v. State, 630 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet.
refd); Janak v. Security Lumber Co., 513 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list
Dist.] 1974, no writ) (quoting 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 1433, at 287 (1956)).
23. See Southern Kan. Ry. v. Barnes, 173 S.W. 880, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1915, writ refd).
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.4, at
EVIDENCE § 212, at 668 (3d ed.
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with him.24 Courts have recognized, however, that "in the varied
affairs of life there are many modes in which one person can become
acquainted with the handwriting of another, besides having seen
him write or correspond[ed] with him, ' 25 and any plausible source
of familiarity has been regarded as sufficient.26
Rule 901(b)(2) codifies this common law method, with the qualification, not mentioned in Texas cases, 27 that a lay witness is not competent to give an opinion on handwriting if his familiarity with the
putative author's hand was acquired for purposes of the litigation.
The purpose of the limitation is to reserve such testimony to experts
testifying under Rule 901(b)(3). 28
E.

Rule 901(b)(3): Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness

901(b)(3) is the only provision in Rule 901 in which the Texas
Rule is substantively different from the federal version. While the
Texas Rule authorizes authentication of a disputed document or
item by comparison by the trier of fact, or by an expert witness, with
an exemplar or exemplars "which have been found by the court to
be genuine, 29 the federal version permits comparison with exemplars "which have been authenticated. ' 30 "Authenticated," as a reference to Rule 901(a) indicates, means simply that a prima facie
case of authenticity has been presented. Therefore, under the Federal Rule it is permissible to authenticate a disputed writing or object by comparison with an exemplar which is itself of disputed
authenticity, so long as there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the exemplar is authentic. In such a case, the jury is given
the initial issue of the authenticity of the exemplar, as well as the
24. See Sartor v. Bolinger, 59 Tex. 411, 415 (1883).
25. Rogers v. Ritter, 79 U.S. 317, 322 (1870).
26. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901.2, at 949 (1981) ("Remarkably little familiarity has been found sufficient."); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW OF EVIDENCE § 221, at 690 (3d ed. 1984) ("qualifications are minimal to say the least");
5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE $ 901(b)(2)[01], at 901-32 (1983)

(any familiarity is sufficient if it satisfies trial court); cf.Askins, Inc. v. Sparks, 56 S.W.2d
279, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ refd) (whenever one is acquainted with
writing of person he may testify to its authenticity).
27. See Tartt and Wolff, Article IX: Authenticationand Identification, 20 Hous. L. REV.
551, 556 (1983).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) advisory committee note.
29. TEX. R. EvID. 901(b)(3).
30. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(3).
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issue of the authenticity of the writing or object with which the exemplar is to be compared. Under the Texas Rule, the exemplar
must be stipulated or found by the judge to be genuine, and the jury
is never given both a primary dispute and an accompanying secondary dispute about an exemplar.
The Texas provision is consistent with prior law in Texas 31 and in
most other jurisdictions.3 2 The Federal Advisory Committee dispensed with the requirement that the exemplar be found by the
court to be genuine as being "at variance with the general treatment
of relevancy which depends upon fulfillment of a condition of
fact."' 33 While perhaps theoretically sound, this analysis was rejected by the Texas drafters for practical reasons. The federal approach contemplates that sometimes a jury must resolve a
preliminary dispute concerning an exemplar, and only then move
on to the question of the document ultimately in controversy. Such
a process, the Texas drafters believed, is apt to be confusing and
distracting. If a party wishes to employ the comparison-with-exemplar method of authentication, surely it is not too much to ask that
he produce at least one specimen, the authenticity of which can be
shown to the court by a preponderance of the evidence.
The most common applications of the comparison-with-exemplar
of authentication are handwriting, 34 typewriting, 35 and balmethod
36
listics; but the possible range of applications is probably infinite:
Much the same technique is used in connection with tire tread
marks, jimmy marks on door jambs, shoe prints, hair, blood and the
like. It depends on a statistical demonstration or assumption that the
markings or other identifying characteristics are so rare (alone or in
combination) that it is likely that they had the same source.37
31. See, e.g., Nass v. Nass, 149 Tex. 41, 46, 228 S.W.2d 130, 132 (1950); Alexander v.
State, 115 S.W.2d 1122, 1125-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ refd); Askins, Inc. v.
Sparks, 56 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ refd); see also TEX. REV.

CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737b (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as to civil actions effective, Sept.
1, 1983).
32. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

IN TRIALS AT COMMON

LAW §§ 2000, 2016

(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
33. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) advisory committee nbte.
34. See5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE I 901(b)(3) [03], at 901-

40 (1983).
35. See id. 901(b)(3) [04], at 901-44.
36. See id. 901(b)(3) [05], at 901-46.
37. See id. 901(b)(3) [01], at 901-34.
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The Rule, like the common law, permits comparison by the trier
of fact either alone or with the assistance of an expert witness.
Whether expert testimony is permitted in the particular situation is
governed by the "helpfulness" standard of Rule 702.38 Whether expert testimony is required is determined by whether ordinary persons would be able to draw conclusions from the data as presented,
without assistance from someone having special skill or knowledge.
F. Rule 901(b) (4)." Distinctive Characteristicsand the Like
Rule 901(b)(4) is a very broad provision encompassing a "great
variety" 39 of circumstantial modes of authentication. The basic pattern of reasoning embodied in the provision is as follows: (1) the
questioned item or document, X, possesses a distinctive feature, Y;
(2) Y is shown to be more or less exclusively associated with a particular person or source, Z; (3) therefore, X probably emanates from
Z. This is the basic pattern of reasoning commonly employed in the
identification of such non-documentary items as fingerprints,4 °
palmprints, 41 and shoe marks. 42 It is also a common method to
identify the author of a writing or the speaker in a telephone conversation; for example, "[a] letter can be shown to have emanated from
a particular person or business by the fact that it would be unlikely
for anyone other than the purported writer to be familiar with the
subject matter of the letter. 43 A speaker over the telephone may
similarly exhibit special knowledge which serves to identify him.44
38. Rule 702, "Testimony by Experts," provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." TEX. R. EViD. 702.
For an analysis of Rule 702 in relation to prior Texas law, see Sutton, Article VII: Opinions
and Expert Witnesses, 20 Hous. L. REV. 445, 451-61 (1983).
39. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.
40. See, e.g., Gibbs v. State, 544 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Matula v.
State, 390 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Robertson v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 35,
37, 322 S.W.2d 620, 622 (1959).
41. See Xanthull v. State, 403 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
42. See Martinez v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 229, 232-33, 333 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1960);
Fletcher v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 157, 159, 324 S.W.2d 2, 4 (1959).
43. 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 901(b)(4) 011, at 901-49

(1983).
44. See, e.g., Gleason v. Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 473, 289 S.W.2d 228, 232 (1956); Earnhart

v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554
S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Liberty
Mutual Ins. v. Preston, 399 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ refd
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The traditional "reply letter doctrine" is simply an instance of the
special knowledge method of circumstantial authentication.45
Under this doctrine, it suffices to authenticate a letter to show that it
was received in due course in response to a previous letter addressed
to the purported author. In addition to letters,46 this doctrine has
been applied in Texas to telegrams47 and could also properly apply
to return telephone calls or to any other mode of responsive
communication.48
G. Rule 901(b)(5): Voice Identfication
The common law has recognized that individual human voices
have distinctive characteristics which can be identified by others.49
Rule 901(b)(5) merely restates the common law on this point. Its
requirements for admissibility are, accordingly, quite liberal. It permits identification "by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any
time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker."5
"Minimal" familiarity has been held to be sufficient to support admissibility under this Rule,5 as under prior common law in Texas. 2
n.r.e.); Texas Candy & Nut Co. v. Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 225, at 696 (3d ed.
1984); 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 901(b)(4) [05], at 901-62 to 64 (1983); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2153, at 752-53
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
46. See, e.g., General Missionary Soc. v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 134 Tex.
564, 567, 136 S.W.2d 599, 601 (1940); National Mut. Accident Ins. Co. v. Davis, 46 S.W.2d
351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932, no writ); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sharp, 5
S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1928, no writ).
47. See Menefee v. Bering Mfg., 166 S.W. 365, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1914,
no writ); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 225, at 696 (3d ed. 1984).
48. See Swift & Co. Employees Benefit Ass'n v. Lemire, 145 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (telephone conversation compared to reply letter).
49. See Massey v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 49, 53-54, 266 S.W.2d 880, 883 (1954) (witness
may identify person by voice despite having not met person until after conversation); Stepp
v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 349, 352, 20 S.W. 753, 754 (1892) (person's voice may be identified
and distinguished); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2155, at 758
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
50. TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).
51. United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir.) (minimal showing of familiarity required), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Locke v. State, 453 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (allowed
identification of defendant based on single hearing during telephone conversation); McKee
v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 479, 42 S.W.2d 77, 80 (1931) (witness identified defendant based on
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Moreover, in contrast to the treatment of lay handwriting identification under Rule 901(b)(2), voice familiarity may be acquired for
purposes of
the litigation, a feature likewise supported by precedent
53
in Texas.
H.

Rule 901(b)(6): Telephone Conversations

Rule 901(b)(6) is designed to illustrate identification of the party
who received a telephone call. Identification of the calling party is
not covered by this example but by examples (4) and (5).54 This
provision distinguishes between business and personal numbers. Its
treatment of business numbers is substantially equivalent to prior
case law in Texas.5 5 Although some Texas authorities suggested
that the proponent had to show by independent evidence the au56
thority of the speaker to take the call on behalf of the business,
other Texas cases permitted the speaker's authority to be
"deemed" 57 or "presumed ' 58 from the contents of the conversation
and the circumstances of the call. Therefore, as a practical matter,
comparison of hearing of defendant's voice at time of murder and while defendant was in
jail); Collins v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 156, 178, 178 S.W. 345, 355 (1915) (identification may be
based on one hearing).
53. See Lomax v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 531, 534, 176 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Tex. Crim. App.
1943) (voice identification of defendant by witness based on hearing voice after his arrest);
McKee v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 479, 42 S.W.2d 77, 80 (1931) (witness testified to identity of
defendant based on voice identification made after defendant incarcerated).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 39-53.
55. See, e.g., Gleason v. Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 472-73, 289 S.W.2d 228, 232 (1956) (call
made to business on line used for business purposes admissible if recipient "represents that
he is the person called and is one authorized to take the message"); Colbert v. Dallas Joint
Stock Land Bank, 136 Tex. 268, 274, 150 S.W.2d 771, 775 (1941) (when call is made to
business number, evidence of conversation with person answering admissible without further evidence of speaker's identity); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 620 S.W.2d
670, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (general rule that contents of call to business
admissible if made to person authorized to receive call); see also City of Ingleside v. Stewart,
554 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (telephone call
received by bookkeeper of contractor admissible to show defendant had requested plaintiff
company to do certain work); Sanderlin v. Dransfield, 523 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (message received over business lines presumed to have
been received by person authorized by business to receive messages).
56. See Gleason v. Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 472-73, 289 S.W.2d 228, 232 (1956); Tartt &
Wolff, Article IX: Authentication and Identfication,20 Hous. L. REv. 551, 566 (1983).
57. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 620 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1981, no writ).
58. See Sanderlin v. Dransfield, 523 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975, no writ).
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the new Rule probably does not substantially change Texas law concerning authentication of calls to business numbers.
As for calls to personal numbers, some pre-Rules Texas authorities suggested that the facts that a number was listed in the name X
and the answerer identified himself as X would not suffice to identify the speaker as X. 5 9 Clearly these facts should be, and under the
new Rules are, sufficient to make out a prima facie case of identity.6 °

I. Rule 901(b)(7)." Public Records or Reports
Rule 901(b)(7) covers two types of items: (1) writings, public or
private, that are lawfully filed in a public office, and (2) public
records that are kept in a public office. A sufficient foundation for
introduction of a writing in the first category consists of showing
that the proffered document was in fact filed in the public office
where such documents are lawfully filed. 6 ' For example, a document that appears to be a deed to a parcel of land in X County can
be authenticated by showing that it is filed in the office in X County
where conveyances are lawfully filed.62 Ordinarily, the requisite
showing will not be by testimony of the custodian, which would be
inconvenient, but by certified copy, as prescribed in Rules 902(4)
and 1005.63 The foundation required for the second category, public records, is even simpler: a showing that the item is a record of a
public office kept in the office. Again, testimony of the custodian
will not normally be presented to satisfy this requirement; certification of the copy is the traditional method and the method approved
in Rules 902(4) and 1005.64
59. See Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 136 Tex. 268, 273-74, 150 S.W.2d 771,
774-75 (1941); Blakely, Summary of Changes Effected by the Texas Rules of Evidence, 20
Hous. L. REV. 625, 661 (1983).

60. Rule 901(b)(6) provides that a telephone conversation may be authenticated "by
evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company
to a particular person or business if, (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, includingsefident!fication, show the person answering to be the one called ......

See TEX. R. EvID.

901(b)(6) (emphasis added).
61. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2158, at 772

(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
62. Cf Smithers v. Lowrance, 100 Tex. 77, 79, 93 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1906) (copy of record pointed out by commissioner showing classification of lands in particular counties is
presumed true and is admissible).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21.

64. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1390 (10th Cir. 1980) (FED.
R. EvID. 1005 designed to avoid need for custodian to produce originals); 5 D. LOUISELL &
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The authentication doctrines embodied in these provisions are not
new; they existed at common law 65 and under previous statutes 66 in
Texas. The only significant change effected by the new Rule is the
abolition of the notice requirement of the previous official records
statute.67
Presentation of any document as evidence potentially presents at
least three issues: authentication, best evidence, and hearsay. When
a purported public record is offered, Rule 901(b)(7) treats only the
first of these issues. The best evidence problem is treated in Rule
1005,68 and the hearsay problem is treated in Rules 803(8)-(10), (14),
(22), and (23).69
C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 592, at 521 (1981) (Rules 902(4) and 1005 are compli-

mentary, eliminate inconvenience of having public officer called away from duties for "trivial purpose of authenticating a public document").
65. See Houston v. Perry, 5 Tex. 462, 465-66 (1849); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2159, at 775-76 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
66. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 373 1a (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as to civil

actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
67. See id. art. 3731a, § 3.
68. Rule 1005, Public Records, provides:
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed
and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if otherwise
admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or
testified to be correct by a, witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be given.
TEX. R. EvID. 1005. For an analysis of Rule 1005, see Hippard, Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs, 20 Hous. L. REV. 595, 613-16 (1983).
69. Rule 803 provides, in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, or (C) factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law; unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births,
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10)

Absence ofpublic record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report,

statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a
matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
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Rule 901(b)(8): Ancient Documents or Data Compilation

In Texas, as in other states, courts have long permitted a document to be received upon a showing that it is ancient, fair on its
face, and located in an appropriate place.70 Rule 901(b)(8) embodies this doctrine, with two modifications of prior Texas law. First,
the Rule covers "data compilations" as well as documents. Second,
the Rule reduces the requisite antiquity to twenty years from the

previous thirty-year period of the common law.7
The rationale for the ancient document rule of authentication is
similar to the rationale for the corresponding hearsay exception now
covered by Rule 803(16).72 As to both, the justification is part necessity and part circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness. The passage
of such a long time suggests the likely absence of witnesses, either to
the substance contained in the document, or to its creation or execu-

(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in propery. The record of a document

purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the
original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it
purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(22) Judgment ofprevious conviction. Evidence of a judgment, entered after a trial or
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty
of a felony, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment of conviction. The pendency of an appeal renders such evidence inadmissible.
(23) Judgment as to personal,family, or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as
proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the
judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation.
TEX. R. EvID. 803. For an analysis of the hearsay exceptions for public records covered by
these provisions, see Wellborn, Article VII: Hearsay, 20 Hous. L. REV. 477, 521-24, 528-30
(1983).
70. See, e.g., Emory v. Bailey, IlI Tex. 337, 340, 234 S.W. 660, 662 (1921) (ancient
documents admissible if shown to come from authorized custody, to lack suspicion, and to
have existed minimum of 30 years); City of Fort Worth v. Bewley, 612 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (admitted title opinions written in 1899 and
stored in city library's archives); Cowan v. Mason, 428 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1968, no writ) ("introduction of ancient instrument is prima facie proof of its
genuineness").
71. Compare TEX. R. EvID. 901(b)(8) (requires document to have been in existence 20
years to qualify as ancient) with Rivere v. Wilkens, 72 S.W. 608, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-1903,
no writ) (allegedly forged deed admissible as ancient document provided shown to be at
least 30 years old).
72. Rule 803(16) creates a hearsay exception for: "Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established." See TEX. R. EvID.
803(16); see also Wellborn, Article V1: Hearsay,20 Hous. L. REV. 477, 525 (1983).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:371

tion. Fraud and forgery are unlikely to be perpetrated so patiently
to bear fruit so many years after a document's creation. Fair appearance and proper location, therefore, are sufficient additional circumstances to justify admissibility of an ancient document.73 Of
course, these conditions only establish prima facie genuineness; the
opponent remains free to attack the genuineness of the item or the
accuracy of its contents or both.74
K.

Rule 901(b)(9). Process or System

Rule 901(b)(9) is one of the broadest illustrations in the Rule.
The Advisory Committee's Note to the Federal Rule cites X-rays
and computer printouts as examples of evidence that may be authenticated under this provision. Obviously, many other kinds of
evidence may fit the category of "results" of "a process or system."75
Equally obviously, an evidentiary foundation for a particular "result" must include, as this provision prescribes, a description of the
process or system showing that it is accurate. Given the logic of that
requirement, it is not surprising that prior law in Texas and elsewhere was consistent with the Rule's formulation. For example,
Texas courts had encountered, in addition to X-rays76 and computer80
78 spectrographic analyses, 79 breath
printouts,77 tape recordings,

73. See IA R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 1372-1376
(Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2137,

at 722 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
74. See Macdonell v. De Los Fuentes, 26 S.W. 792, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ
ref'd) (age of document may be sufficient proof of execution to allow admission but its credibility remains question for jury). But see Kellogg v. Southwestern Lumber Co., 44 S.W.2d
742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ refd) (court may presume genuineness of
ancient document if no suspicious circumstances and may instruct verdict).
75. TEX. R. EvID. 901(b)(9).
76. See Community Chapel Funeral Home v. Allen, 499 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.) (x-rays admissible if competent witness can identify
evidence and show it to be proper portrayal of injury); Hartman v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
417 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ) (x-rays not admitted where proponent failed to show who made them, how made, or if accurate).
77. See Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 468 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin), writ refjdn.r.e per curiam,471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 197 1) (computer records admissible
upon showing of reliability of system, regularity of entry, and knowledge of source of
information).
78. See Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (lists seven criteria for admission of tape recordings); Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767, 773
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding exclusion of recording on
facts presented as within discretion of trial court).
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and blood8 ' tests for alcohol, ultrasonic tests,8 2 and gyroscopic directional surveys. 83 In each case, the basic requirements for authentication amounted to those of the present Rule: a description of the
process or system adequate to permit the trier of fact to understand
and evaluate its accuracy, followed by a showing of its accurate application in the particular instance that produced the proffered
evidence.
The comprehensiveness and elaborateness of the requisite description of a given process or system will vary according to the
complexity of the system, of course, and also according to its familiarity to lay persons and to courts. Novel systems, and novel applications of familiar systems, will require more complete explanations
than will routine applications of processes or systems that have become a common part of modem life. Indeed, as one commentator
on the Federal Rules of Evidence has observed:
It is probably fair to say that in most instances evidence of the results of a process or system is simply admitted without evidence ever
being introduced either as to the capability of the process or system
properly employed to produce an accurate result, or as to the actual
employment and operation of the process or system in the matter at
hand. This is almost always the case, for example, where a physician
testifies to the results of a test such as an electroencephalogram. 4
79. See Hernandez v. State, 530 S.W.2d 563, 566-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (spectrographic analysis admissible when based on comparison with other data "available in the
appropriate literature and the spectra obtained from known reference samples of the drug").
80. See French v. State, 484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). For the results of
a breath test to be admissible the state must show:
1) the use of properly compounded chemicals; 2) the existence of periodic supervision
over the machine and operation by one who understands the scientific theory of the
machine; 3) proof of the result of the test by a witness or witnesses qualified to translate
and interpret such result so as to eliminate hearsay.
See id at 719; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701L-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
81. See Westchester Fire Ins. v. Wendeborn, 559 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pathologists testified that deceased's blood-alcohol level
showed intoxication).
82. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Trinity Indus., 478 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (whether proper predicate for ultrasonic test has been
laid is in discretion of trial court).
83. See Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964)
(evidence admissible where witness explained operation of instrument and proper surveying
techniques; trial court's decision sustained unless abuse of discretion), rey'd on other grounds,
407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), cer. denied, 386 U.S. 944 (1967).
84. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 9.01.9, at 969 (1981).
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Two explanations may be offered to account for this permissiveness,
or rather to ratify it under the new Rules. First, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901(b)(9) states: "Example (9) does not, of
course, foreclose taking judicial notice of the accuracy of the process
or system. ' '85 Second, under Rule 703, an expert witness may base
an opinion upon facts or data even though they are not in a form
that would be admissible in evidence. 86 Both of these features
should be taken into account when attempting to apply Rule
901 (b)(9).
L. Rule 901(b)(10). Methods Providedby Statute or Rule
Rule 901(b)(10) incorporates by reference any method of identification or authentication that is prescribed in any statute or any rule
promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court under its statutory authority. Many Texas civil statutes that dealt with authentication
were repealed in connection with the adoption of the Texas Rules of
Evidence. Some, however, were not repealed, such as the provision
on breath tests for intoxication.87 Statutes such as this survive the
adoption of the Rules of Evidence and continue to operate through
Rule 901(b)(10). Likewise, any authentication rules that might be
enacted by the legislature in the future, or adopted by the supreme
court under statutory rulemaking power, will automatically be accommodated through this incorporation provision.
M.

Rule 902: Self-Authentication

Rule 902 accords special treatment-at least with regard to authentication-to several kinds of writings. These writings are said to
be self-authenticating, that is, admissible without any "[e]xtrinsic
evidence of authenticity. 88 The idea is not new; prior to the Federal and Texas Rules of Evidence, statutes existed in every jurisdic85. FED. R. EViD. 901(b)(9) advisory committee note.
86. See TEX. R. EvID. 703. The Rule provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Id. See generally Sutton, Article VII. Opinions andExpert Witnesses, 20 Hous. L. REV. 445,
462-68 (1983) (analyzes Rule in relation to prior Texas law).
87. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 670 1L-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
88. TEX. R. EvID. 902.
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tion, 9 including Texas, 90 giving such preferred treatment to certain
types of documents. 9' The principal reason usually advanced for
dispensing with the requirement of extrinsic evidence of genuineness is the comparative unlikelihood that a particular document of
the type would not be authentic.92
The consequence of treating a document as self-authenticating, as
described by McCormick, is that "one of these may be tendered to
the court and, even without the shepherding angel of an authenticating witness, will be accepted in evidence for what it purports to
be. ' ' 9 3 Its genuiness may still be challenged and attacked by evidence. If the opposing evidence is sufficient to support a finding
that the document is not authentic, the trier of fact will be permitted
to make such a finding. 94 The sole effect of Rule 902 is to make the
appearance of the document, by itself, sufficient to constitute a
prima facie case of its authenticity; that prima facie case, like any
other, is subject to rebuttal.
Rule 902 only governs the authentication issue. A document that
is self-authenticating may nevertheless be inadmissible for other
reasons, such as the best evidence rule, 95 the hearsay rule, 96 or a
privilege. 97 Additionally, self-authentication does not mean that a
89. See FED. R. EvID. 902 advisory committee note; C. MCCORMICK,HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228, at 699 (3d ed. 1984); Comment, Authentication and the Best
Evidence Rule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 195, 209 (1969).
90. See Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence-A Proposed Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969,

1011-12 (1977) (collecting Texas statutes).
91. The documents that have most commonly received this preferred treatment include
acknowledged instruments, such as conveyances, certified public records, publicly printed
documents, and documents bearing official seals. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228, at 696 (3d ed. 1984); Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 195, 210 (1969).
92. See FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee note; United States v. Howard-Arias,

679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Rule 902 recognizes that the possibility of fraud, forgery
and misattribution of certain documents is so slight that the general requirement of authentication by extrinsic evidence . . . is dispensed with."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); M.
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 902.0 (1981); 5 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 528, at 161 (1981).
93. C. MCCORMICK,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228, at 700 (3d ed. 1984).

94. See FED.R. EVID. 902 advisory committee note. Tartt and Wolff misleadingly describe the effect of the Rule to be that "the document isconclusively deemed genuine, for
admissibility purposes." Tartt & Wolff, Article IX: Authentication and Identification, 20
Hous. L. REV.551, 577 (1983).
95. See TEX. R. EVID. art. X.
96. See id art. VIII.
97. See id art. V.
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writing may be introduced without any foundation. It is still necessary to establish the relevancy of the document.98 Therefore, while
Rule 902 may mean that a document may be offered without "the
shepherding angel of an authenticating witness," 99 that does not
necessarily mean that the document may be introduced by counsel
unaccompanied by any oral testimony. Normally, some oral testimony will accompany the introduction of such a document, to supply a context necessary to establish its relevancy.
N.

Rule 902(1).: Domestic Public Documents Under Seal

Under this provision, any document that appears to have been
issued by any American public entity, bearing what appears to be
the official seal of the issuing entity and an official signature, is
prima facie authentic. As applied to Texas public documents that
bear a seal, this provision yields approximately the same treatment
as prior law.1°° As applied to out-of-state documents, the new Rule
is more lenient than the former law, which required that the "attestation" of the document "shall be accompanied with a certificate
that the attesting officer has the legal custody of such writing."'' °
No such certificate is required under Rule 902(1); it suffices that the
document bears a purported seal and a purported official signature.
It should be noted that this Rule only applies to original documents executed by public entities or officials. Copies of public
records are governed by Rules 902(4) and 1005.
0.

Rule 902(2)." Domestic Public Documents Not Under Seal

Rule 902(2) denies self-authentication to public documents not
bearing a seal, on account of "the greater ease of effecting a forgery."10 2 If the officer executing the document has no seal, the docu98. See id. 402. The Rule provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by Constitution, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is
inadmissible." Id 402.
99. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228, at 700 (3d ed. 1984).
100. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 373 1a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as

to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983); see also id arts. 3719, 3720, 3722, 3724, 3725, 3731
(Vernon 1926) (repealed as to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
101. Id. art. 373 1a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as to civil actions, effective Sept.
1, 1983).
102. FED. R. EvID. 902(2) advisory committee note.
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ment can be rendered self-authenticating only by certification by an
appropriate officer who has and attaches a seal.
This procedure is similar to the certification procedure for out-ofstate documents that was prescribed in the former Texas official
records statute. °3 Since no such certification was required under
the old statute for Texas documents that were "attested by" the appropriate officer, regardless of whether that officer had and attached
a seal, the effect of Rules 902(1) and (2) appears, to this extent, to be
more restrictive than the prior law. That is, now even a Texas official document must bear a seal to be self-authenticating. If the officer who executed it has no seal, then it must either be
authenticated testimonially under Rule 901, or it must be certified
by some other appropriate official who has a seal.
P. Rule 902(3)." Foreign Public Documents
Rule 902(3) greatly liberalizes the treatment of foreign public
documents in Texas courts. It is based upon the corresponding federal evidence rule, which in turn was derived from former Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 44(a)(2).'"
A comparison of the new Rule with the former Texas official
records statute as applied to foreign documents reveals several important points. First, article 3731a required that the document be
attested by its legal custodian, and some Texas cases refused to admit foreign records because there was no showing that the person
who had attested them had legal custody. 0 But, in many countries
the concept of legal custody is unknown, and it is practically impossible to find a person who may be said to have legal custody of a
particular record or document. 0 6 Therefore, elimination in the new
103. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 373 1a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as
to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
104. See5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(3)[01], at 902-15
to -17 (1983) (federal evidence rule adopts the "liberalizing trend" of Rule 44(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
105. See Cooley v. Cooley, 503 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no
writ) (Iranian records not admissible because no showing that anyone had legal custody);
Moody v. Moody, 465 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ rerd
n.r.e.) (no showing of legal custody by any foreign official), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 990 (1972).
106. See Smit, IniernationalAspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1031, 1062 (1961) ("the concept of a custodian of official records may be unknown to the
applicable foreign law").
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Rule of the requirement of legal custody reflects a more realistic and
practical approach to foreign documents.
The former statute required that the attestation of a foreign document by its legal custodian be accompanied by a certificate that the
attesting officer had legal custody of the document. Such a certificate was required to have been made by a consul or similar official
of the foreign government or by an American foreign service repre17 The new Rule permits what are called
sentative in that country.
"chain certificates." 0 8 The official who makes the final certification
need not be able to verify the authority of the original attesting foreign officer and the genuineness of his execution; he need only certify the prior certification of any foreign official in a chain of
certificates that relate to the execution and attestation. This is a desirable alternative in many cases because the authority, position,
and incumbency of the original foreign official may be unknown to
the American official providing the final certification. 10 9
Article 3731 a also required pretrial notice by any party seeking to
introduce a public record, domestic or foreign."10 No such impediment is found in Rule 902.
The last sentence of Texas Rule 902(3) does not appear in the
federal version. Its purpose is to call attention to an alternative
form of authentication of documents originating in countries which
have executed a treaty with the United States providing for simplified proof of one another's documents. Specifically, the sentence
was inspired by the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents, I ' which was adopted at
the Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law in 1960 and which became effective in the United States in

107. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as
to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
108. See Smit, InternationalAspects of Federal Civil Procedure,61 COLUM. L. REV.
1031, 1067-68 (1961) (discussing advantages of chain certification).
109. See 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(3)[01], at 902-16
(1983); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1063

(1961).
110. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as
to civil actions, effective Sept. I, 1983).
111. See S. REP. No. 17, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE

902(3)[02], at 902-18 (1983).
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1981 pursuant to ratification by the Senate in 1979.112 Under the
supremacy clause, of course, this convention would be binding on
Texas courts even if the Texas Rules of Evidence ignored it. The
Texas drafters chose to include the reference in Rule 902(3) in the
hope that it would promote the use of this convenient agreement.
Under the Convention, public documents from signatory countries are rendered self-authenticating in the courts of other countries
if they bear a certificate called an apostille. An apostille simply
states that the document is authentic, signed in an official capacity,
and that any stamp or seal is genuine." 3 Each signatory country
designates to the Hague Convention which of its officials shall be
competent to issue the apostille. If the foreign document emanates
from a participating country and bears the apostille, the effect of the
Convention is to render unnecessary the final certification that Rule
902(3) would otherwise require.
Lastly, Rule 902(3) provides that final certification may be dispensed with, and a document "treated as presumptively authentic"--or even "evidenced by an attested summary with or without
final certification"-upon a showing of good cause, if all parties
have been given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the document's authenticity and accuracy. This exemption has been liberally applied by the federal courts. 1 4 It may be used whether or not
the document comes from a country that participates in the Hague
Convention.
Q.

Rule 902(4): Certified Copies of Public Records

Rule 902(4) follows the common law"I5 and previous Texas stat112. See5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

902(3)[02], at 902-18

(1983).
113. See idat 902-18.
114. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez Serrate, 534 F.2d 7, 10 (lst Cir. 1976)
(although proponent of evidence did not strictly comply with Rule, court admitted document as proponent showed good cause and opponent was given opportunity to determine
document's accuracy); United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1975) (document
admitted where government could not comply with Ruli because foreign official refused to
follow any authentication procedures other than his country's); In re Sterling Navigation
Co., 444 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Rule not complied with, but opponent did not
deny authenticity).
115. See FED. R. EVID. 902(4) advisory committee note; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228, at 700 (3d ed. 1984).
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utes 16 in permitting a public record to be evidenced by a copy certified as correct by the custodian or other qualified public officer. The
certification must comply with the requirements of the appropriate
provision of this Rule for original public documents, either paragraph (1), (2), or (3).' '7 Certified copies have traditionally been permitted to prove public records because of reluctance to remove
originals from their proper custody and because of the inconvenience of requiring testimony of the custodian in order to authenticate either an original or a copy. I8
Rule 1005 also authorizes proof of the contents of public records
by a copy rather than by the original.' '9 Where the proffered document presents a hearsay problem, Rule 803(8),120 or some other exception,12 may apply.
116. SeeTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3718-3722, 3724-3731, (Vernon 1926); Id art.
373 Ia, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983); IA R.
RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 1287-1291 (Texas Practice 3d ed.
1980); Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence-A Proposed Codcation,31 Sw. L.J. 969, 1011
(1977).
117. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(4). For examples of applications of FED. R. EVID. 902(4),
see United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1979) (in order to show that check had
been deposited in mail, government introduced progress sheet used by Treasury Department; held, all that is necessary under 902(4) is that legal custodian's affidavit note his position of authority and that copy is correct); United States v. Pent-R-Books, Inc., 538 F.2d 519,
527-28 (2d Cir. 1976) (admitting postal administrative records where certified by postal official rather than custodian; all that is required is authorized person), cert. denied,430 U.S.
906 (1977).
118. Cf 5 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 532, at 192-93 (1981)
(purpose is to avoid inconvenience of removing records from official custody).
119. Rule 1005, Public Records, provides:
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed
and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if otherwise
admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or
testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be given.
TEX. R. EVID. 1005. For an analysis of Rule 1005, see Hippard, Article X: Contents of
Writings, Recordings, and Photographs,20 Hous. L. REV. 595, 613-16 (1983).
120. TEX. R. EVID. 803(8) (hearsay exception for public records and reports); see also
Wellborn, Article VII1." Hearsay,20 Hous. L. REV. 477, 521-22 (1983) (general discussion of
hearsay exception for public records and reports).
121. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(9) (records of vital statistics); id. 803(10) (absence of public
record or entry); id. 803(12) (marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates); id 803(14)
(records of documents affecting an interest in property); id. 803(22) (judgment of previous
conviction); id 803(23) (judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or boundaries).
See generally Wellborn, Article VIII. Hearsay, 20 Hous. L. REV. 477, 522-24, 528-30 (1983)
(discusses the various exceptions to the hearsay rule).
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Rule 902(5)." Official Publications

Rule 902(5) clarifies a broad self-authentication rule for governmental publications that had apparently already been established in
Texas under statutes. An old Texas statute prescribed admissibility
of statute books. 122 The former official records statute broadly recognized "official publication" as an alternative to attestation. 123 It

was interpreted to justify admission of a pamphlet purportedly published by a federal agency without further authentication. 124 That
decision would appear to be coextensive with the new Rule. The
justification generally advanced for this broad doctrine is that it is
unusual for an official publication to contain major errors, and the
authenticity of such official publications is easily determined. 125
S.

Rule 902(6)." Newspapers and Periodicals

Rule 902(6) is a new doctrine, not based on prior common law
27 It does, howauthority, either in the federal courts 126 or in Texas.1
2
8
ever, have ample support in common sense.
One problem remains unresolved. Rule 902(6) only dispenses
with proof of the genuineness of the specimen publication. It does
not address other possible attribution problems, such as the source
122. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3718 (Vernon 1926) (repealed as to civil matters, effective Sept. 1, 1983); IA R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 1292, at 491 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980).
123. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 373 1a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as
to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
124. See Transport Ins. Co. v. Liggins, 625 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (publication of U.S. Dep't of Human Resources was official publication admissible without certification or attestation by legal custodian); see also Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Duncan, 353 S.W.2d 315, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, no writ) (U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture market reports admissible on issue of prices of certain goods).
125. See5 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 533, at 207 (1981); 5 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(5)[01], at 902-30 (1983).
126. See 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 528, at 161 (1983).
127. See Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence-A ProposedCodification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969,
1011 n.241 (1977); Tartt & Wolff, Article 1X: Authentication and Idenification,20 Hous. L.
REV. 551, 585 (1983).
128. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.§ 228, at 701 (3d
ed. 1984) (self-authentication as to newspapers logical and long overdue); 5 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
902(6)[01], at 902-31 (1983) (unlikely that forgery
could be successfully perpetrated, particularly in libel case, where opponent in position to
prove forgery by producing true copy); Wendorf, Should Texas Adopt the FederalRules of
Evidence, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 248, 279 (1976) (self-authentication of newspapers and periodicals worthwhile because of wide use and little chance of falsification).
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of a notice or advertisement contained in the publication. The common law at the time of the Federal Rule did not treat the presence
of an item in a publication as prima facie evidence of its attributed
origin. 129 The Advisory Committee's Note to the Federal Rule indicates no design to change that part of the common law. It states:
"Establishing the authenticity of the publication may, of course,
leave open questions of authority and responsibility for items
therein contained."' 3 ° Some authorities have argued, nonetheless,
that a presumption of authorship or instigation should attach in
such cases.' 3 1 This seems to be an open question upon which, perhaps, no fixed rule can be urged. There may be a difference, for
example, between a commercial advertisement for which the publication has received a fee and a letter or notice which is published
without charge. 132 It may be best to leave it to the discretion of the
trial judge to determine, according to the circumstances of the particular case, whether or not to require extrinsic evidence that an attributed portion of a published newspaper or periodical did, in fact,
emanate from the named source.
T.

Rule 902(7): Trade Inscriptions and the Like

Writings falling into this category present a very good case for
self-authentication. Trade names and the like are customarily accepted in commerce as accurate indicia of ownership or origin of the
product to which they are attached. 133 The likelihood of false attribution is diminished by the considerable legal protection afforded
129. See Mancari v. Frank P. Smith, Inc., 114 F.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("mere
presence in printed material of the name of a particular person constitutes no substantial
evidence that that person caused such material to be written or published"); Collins v. State,
75 Tex. Crim. 534, 536, 171 S.W. 729, 731 (1914) (advertisement in newspaper associating

defendant with infirmary not admissible unless showing of authorization by defendant or
showing of connection between defendant and infirmary); see also 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2150, at 748 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978) (no judicial authority

for relying on attribution alone as sufficient evidence of authorship).
130. FED. R. EVID. 902(6) advisory committee note.
131. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 902.6, at 981 (1981); 5 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(6)[01], at 902-31 (1983); Tartt &
Wolff, Article IX.Authentication and Identification, 20 Hous. L. REV. 551, 585 (1983).
132. Cf 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
902(6)[01], at 902-

32(1983) ("Publishers look to the named advertisers for their pay, and it is not the custom of
the business world to give another free advertising.").
133. See5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 535, at 237 (1981); 5 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
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trademarks and trade names. 13 4 In cases of genuine dispute, the putative manufacturer, seller, or proprietor is in a much better position
than anyone else to produce evidence concerning genuineness. 135
Despite these considerations, prior law was not consistent. Some
cases accorded presumptive authenticity to such items as labels,
trademarks, and brand names; 36 others refused to do so, sometimes
with unseemly results. 137 In Texas, there was authority for self-authentication of brands on livestock 3 8 and company insignia
on ve140
hicles,' 39 but no general doctrine like the present rule.
Rule 902(7) obviates extrinsic proof of the origin of an item, insofar as it is indicated on the label or inscription. Where matters of
origin beyond those indicated by the label or inscription are material, Rule 902(7) does not help, and extrinsic proof may be necessary. A Texas case decided prior to adoption of the Rules, CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Fillmore,"4 illustrates this point. Plaintiff obtained a judgment in the trial court upon evidence that he purchased
a bottle of Coca-Cola from a machine at a service station in Levelland and discovered a dead cockroach in it after drinking half its
contents. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment because
134. See 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(7)[01], at 902-33
(1983).
135. See Brown, Authentication and Contents of Writings, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 611,
629.
136. See, e.g., Doyle v. Continental Baking Co., 160 N.E. 325, 326 (Mass. 1928) (loaf of
bread); Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 762, 764 (Miss. 1932) (candy bar); Weiner v.
Mager & Throne, Inc., 3 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (Mun. Ct. 1938) (loaf of bread).
137. See Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 62 F.2d 564, 565 (1st Cir. 1933) (name on can
not alone sufficient to connect defendant with item); Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 110 A.2d
599, 601 (Me. 1954) (plaintiff injured by metal in can of peas; label by itself insufficient, must
have extrinsic evidence connecting defendant to can).
138. See Chowning v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 81, 83, 51 S.W. 946, 949 (1899) (recognizing
registered brand as proof of ownership); McKenzie v. State, 32 Tex. Crim 568, 576-77, 25
S.W. 426, 427 (1894) (brands recorded with county clerk prove ownership while unrecorded
brands do not show control or management); Massey v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 91, 92, 19 S.W.
908, 909 (1892) (to be effective, statute requires that record of brand indicate where it will be
placed on animal); see also TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 144.107 (Vernon 1982) ("registered
tattoo mark is prima facie evidence of the ownership of the tattooed livestock").
139. See Kirk v. Harrington, 255 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953,
no writ) (name and address on side of truck raises presumption of ownership); Strickland
Transp. Co. v. Atkins, 223 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, no writ) (name or
insignia appearing on truck will raise rebuttable presumption).
140. See Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence-A ProposedCodification,31 Sw. L.J. 969,
1011 (1977) (no express Texas authority for rule like Federal Rule 902(7)).
141. 453 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, no writ).
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there was no evidence that the bottle of Coca-Cola purchased by
plaintiff had been bottled in Lubbock. As indicated in the opinion,
plaintiff needed to present some evidence that the machine in Level42
land had been filled with bottles sold by the particular defendant. 1
Under the new Rules the result should be the same. The bottle, in
Fillmore, bore no indication that it came from the Lubbock bottler, 143 so that relationship, obviously necessary to plaintiff's case,
would have to be supplied by extrinsic evidence.
I

t:

U. Rule 902(8)." Acknowledged Documents
Rule 902(8) follows prior Texas law in treating properly acknowledged documents as self-authenticating.'" Normally, the acknowledgment will be taken before a notary public, although certain other
officers in Texas are authorized by statute to take acknowledgments. 145 Statutes in Texas which supply the proper forms of acknowledgments 46 have not been repealed or altered by the
adoption of these Rules.
V.

Rule 902(9).: Commercial Paperand Related Documents
As used in this provision, the phrase "general commercial law,"
14
for practical purposes, means the Uniform Commercial Code. 1
The effect of Rule 902(9) is to refer to certain provisions of the
Texas U.C.C. that create presumptive authenticity for various commercial instruments, or parts thereof, in some circumstances. There
are three sections of the Code that have such purposes.
Section 1.202, "Prima Facie Evidence by Third Party Documents," provides:
A document in due form purporting to be a bill of lading, policy or
142. See id. at 241.
143. See id at 241. The bottom of the bottle was inscribed "Greenville, Texas," presumably to designate where the bottle was made, not where it was filled.
144. See Jousan v. Presidio Corp., 590 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1979, no writ); Mack Fin. Corp. v. Decker, 461 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1970, no writ); Cowan v. Mason, 428 S.W.2d 96, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1968, no writ); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3723 (Vernon 1926) (repealed as to civil
actions, effective Sept. I, 1983).
145. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6602 (Vernon 1969).

146. See id arts. 6603, 6604, 6607, 6607a (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1984).
147. See FED. R. EvID. 902(9) advisory committee note; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 17 (1973); 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 902(9)[01], at

902-36 (1983).
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certificate of insurance, official weigher's or inspector's certificate,
consular invoice, or any other document authorized or required by the
contract to be issued by a third party shall be prima facie evidence of
its own authenticity and genuineness and of the facts stated in the
document by the third party.' 4 8

The official commentary to the section explains that it is a restatement of a common law rule grounded in trustworthiness 4 9 and that
its applicability is limited to documents authorized by the agreement or contract, in litigation arising out of the contract. 50 It applies only to documents issued by third parties and does not cover a
document, such as a bill of lading, issued by one of the principals.' 5 '
Section 3.307(a) of the Code deals with proof of signatures on
negotiable instruments. It provides that unless specifically denied in
the pleadings, each signature on an instrument is admitted; if controverted, signatures are presumed to be genuine-in other words,
self-authenticating-"except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who has died or become incompetent."' 152 This section of the U.C.C. is supplemented in Texas by
Rules 93(7) and (8) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which
the genuineness of signatures on
require that denials in pleadings of
1 53
instruments sued upon be sworn.
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
149. See id.comment 1.
comment 2.
150. See id.
151. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lone Star Steel Co., 498 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
152. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
153. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 93, which provides, in pertinent part:
A pleading setting up any of the following matters, unless the truth of such matters
appear of record, shall be verified by affidavit.
(7) Denial of the execution by himself or by his authority of any instrument in writing,
upon which any pleading is founded, in whole or in part and charged to have been
executed by him or by his authority, and not alleged to be lost or destroyed. Where
such instrument in writing is charged to have been executed by a person then deceased,
the affidavit shall be sufficient if it state that the affiant has reason to believe and does
believe that such instrument was not executed by the decedent or by his authority. In
the absence of such a sworn plea, the instrument shall be received in evidence as fully
proved.
(8) A denial of the genuineness of the indorsement or assignment of a written instrument upon which suit is brought by an indorsee or assignee and in the absence of such a
sworn plea, the indorsement or assignment thereof shall be held as fully proved. The
denial required by this subdivision of the rule may be made upon information and
belief.
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Finally, section 3.510 of the Texas U.C.C. provides that protests,
bank stamps or tickets indicating dishonor, and bank records showing dishonor are self-authenticating. 51 4 In other words, a party who
must prove the fact of dishonor may do so by presenting any of
these without extrinsic evidence.
W.

Rule 902(10): Business Records Accompanied by Affidavit

Texas Rule 902(10) is the only provision in Article IX that has no
counterpart in the Federal Rules. It is derived from portions of the
former Texas business records statute. 55 Its purpose, like that of its
statutory predecessor, is to provide a convenient method for laying a
foundation for business records, a method that does not require calling the custodian as a witness at trial. In effect, it creates a method
for proof of private records comparable to the proof of public
records under Rule 902(4). The private custodian's affidavit under
this Rule corresponds to the public custodian's certification under
Rule 902(4).
The requirements of this provision are fourfold: (1) the records
and the accompanying affidavit must be filed with the court clerk at
least fourteen days prior to the commencement of the trial;
(2) "prompt" notice of this filing must be served on all parties;
(3) the records must be made available for inspection and copying;
and (4) the affidavit must conform to the substance of the model in
the Rule and Rules 803(6) and (7).
Although Rule 902(10) is based upon former article 3737e, sections 5-8, it is considerably simpler than those provisions. The statute treated medical records and X-rays differently from other
business records, imposing special requirements upon X-rays in particular. 5 6 The new Rule treats X-rays and other medical records
like other records, so long as they comply with the basic requirements of Rules 803(6) and (7).

Id
154. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.5 10 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
155. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, §§ 5-8 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed
as to civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
156. See id § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (repealed as to civil actions, effective Sept. 1,
1983).
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Rule 902(11): Presumptions Under Statutes or Other Rules

This incorporation-by-reference provision is the equivalent of
Federal Rule 902(10) adapted to the state setting. It parallels Rule
90 1(b)(10), which incorporates methods of authentication other than
self-authentication. Commentary on Rule 901(b)(10) applies to this
57
Rule. 1
An example of a statutory self-authentication provision that is
made applicable under Rule 902(11) is section 59 of the Probate
Code. It prescribes a form of affidavit which, if properly executed
by the testator and witnesses, will render a will "self-proved."'5
Y.

Rule 903. Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary

At common law, if an instrument was attested by subscribing witnesses, it could not be authenticated without producing at least one
of the attestors or showing them all to be unavailable. 5 9 This inconvenient doctrine was limited in Texas, in 1933, by a statute
equivalent to the present Rule. 160 Under both the statute and Rule
903, production of or accounting for attesting witnesses is only required if the writing is required by law to be attested. Very few
writings are now required to be attested. In Texas, the most important of these is a will that is not entirely in the handwriting of the
testator. Under the Probate Code, even such an attested will may be
authenticated without production of the subscribing witnesses if it is
accompanied by affidavits of the testator and witnesses as prescribed
1
16
in the Code.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to provide a practical survey
of Article IX of the Texas Rules of Evidence against the background
of the prior case law and statutes that it replaces, and to help practicing lawyers and judges who are familiar with the prior law to
adjust to the new law with a minimum of inconvenience. This task
157. See supra text accompanying note 87.
158. SeeTEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980); infratext accompanying note 161.
159. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 220, at 668 (3d ed.
1984).

160. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3734a (Verno, Supp. 1984) (repealed as to
civil actions, effective Sept. 1, 1983).
161. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
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has been made easier by the fact that this portion of the Rules effects
few significant changes in Texas law. It is in the nature of restatement rather than reform. In this, its drafters may be criticized or
praised. Representatives of all segments of the Texas civil bar and
bench participated in the process that engendered the Texas Rules
of Evidence. Nowhere in that process was any provision of Article
IX the subject of serious controversy or struggle. Since Article IX is
a version of the status quo ante in its subject area, that status quo
has been endorsed, in effect, by those most familiar with it and most
affected by it.
In 1984, based on recommendations of a standing committee of
the State Bar, the Texas Supreme Court amended a number of the
Texas Rules of Evidence. 62 None of the Rules in Article IX were
amended. It is likely that these Rules will remain unchanged and
uncontroversial for some time.

162. See Tex. Sup. Ct. Order June 25, 1984, effective Nov. 1, 1984. This order may be
found in 47 TEx. B.J. 933 (1984).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/5

32

Wellborn: Authentication and Identification under Article IX of the Texas R

19851

TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE

APPENDIX

TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IX.
Rule 901.

AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

Requirement of Authentication or Identification

(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way
of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired
for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by trieror expert witness. Comparison by the trier
of fact or by expert witness with specimens which have been found by
the court to be genuine.
(4) Distinctive characteristicsand the like. Appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken
in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice identfication. Identification of a voice, whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the
telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the
case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the
person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business,
the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related
to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized
by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public
office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature
are kept.
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(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a docu'ment or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to
create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence
twenty years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process of system. Evidence describing a process or system
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
(10) Methodsprovided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by statute or by other rule prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Rule 902.

Self-Authentication

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any State, district,
Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a
political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or
employee of any entity included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no
seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the
district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies
under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.
(3) Foreignpublic documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and
accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or
(B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature
and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a
chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position
relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or
consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the
United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties
to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the
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court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be
evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.
The final certification shall be dispensed with whenever both the
United States and the foreign country in which the official record is
located are parties to a treaty or convention that abolishes or displaces
such requirement, in which case the record and the attestation shall be
certified by the means provided in the treaty or convention.
(4) Certiedcopies ofpublic records. A copy of an official record
or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be
recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by
certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or
complying with any statute or other rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority.
(5) Officialpublications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications
purporting to be issued by public authority.
(6) Newspapers andperiodicals.Printed materials purporting to be
newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law
by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgments.
(9) Commercialpaper and related documents. Commercial paper,
signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law.
(10) Business records accompaniedby affidavit.
a. Records or photocopies; admissibility; affidavit; filing. Any
record or set of records or photographically reproduced copies of
such records, which would be admissible under Rule 803(6) or (7)
shall be admissible in evidence in any court in this state upon the
affidavit of the person who would otherwise provide the prerequisites of Rule 803(6) or (7), that such records attached to such affidavit were in fact so kept as required by Rule 803(6) or (7), provided
further, that such record or records along with such affidavit are
filed with the clerk of the court for inclusion with the papers in the
cause in which the record or records are sought to be used as evidence at least fourteen (14) days prior to the day upon which trial of
said cause commences, and provided the other parties to said cause
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are given prompt notice by the party filing same of the filing of such
record or records and affidavit, which notice shall identify the name
and employer, if any, of the person making the affidavit and such
records shall be made available to the counsel for other parties to
the action or litigation for inspection and copying. The expense for
copying shall be borne by the party, parties or persons who desire
copies and not by the party or parties who file the records and serve
notice of said filing, in compliance with this rule. Notice shall be
deemed to have been promptly given if it is served in the manner
contemplated by Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, fourteen (14) days prior to commencement of trial in said cause.
b. Form of affidavit. A form of the affidavit of such person as
shall make such affidavit as is permitted in paragraph (a) above
shall be sufficient if it follows this form, though this form shall not
be exclusive, and an affidavit which substantially complies with the
provisions of this rule shall suffice, to-wit:
No.

John Doe (Name of Plaintiff)
IN THE
v.
COURT IN AND FOR
John Roe (Name of Defendant) I
COUNTY, TEXAS
AFFIDAVIT
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared
, who, being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows:
My name is
, I am of sound mind, capable of
making this affidavit, and personally acquainted with the facts herein
stated:
I am the custodian of the records of
. Attached
hereto are __
pages of records from
. These
said
- pages of records are kept by
in the regular
course of business, and it was the regular course of business of
for an employee or representative of
., with knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded to make the record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such record; and the record was made at
or near the time or reasonably soon thereafter. The records attached
hereto are the original or exact duplicates of the original.
Affiant
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SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the
day of
, 19.
Notary Public in and for
(11)

County, Texas.

Presumptions under statutes or other rules. Any signature,

document, or other matter declared by statute or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority to be
prima facie genuine or authentic.
Comment. Paragraph (10) is based on portions of the affidavit authentication provisions
of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e. The most general and comprehensive language from those provisions was chosen. It is intended that this method of authentication
shall be available for any kind of regularly kept record that satisfies the requirements of
Rule 803(6) and (7), including X-rays, hospital records, or any other kind of regularly kept
medical record.

Rule 903.

Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary

The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose
laws govern the validity of the writing.
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